Monday, April 30, 2007

Essay

American Sex:
Rethinking the Intention of Sex Education

Sex education has, and continues to be, an issue of much debate. The moral implications that sexual intercourse carries are numerous. Should one be married before committing to sex? What about unintended pregnancy? Sexually transmitted diseases? These are a few of the many concerns parents, teachers, friends, and lovers have when faced with human sexuality. The belief that sex education provides an impetus for premarital sex has largely dictated public sex education. Thusly, educators can be pressured to avoid culturally “taboo” topics. This has stifled objective, scientific discussion of human sexuality, which restricts broader cultural sexual beliefs and practices. Through examination of previous sex education policy that arose from public health concerns, debunking conservative and liberal beliefs regarding sex education, and understanding the strong and broader influence that education has on culture, one sees that the American sex education system is inefficient.

Despite the constitutional notion of a separation between church and state, the United States has been largely built around traditional Judeo-Christian ethics and morals. The union of marriage between one man and one woman is one of the highest attainments under God. The book of Hebrews in the New Testament says, “Let marriage be honored in every way and the marriage bed be kept undefiled, for God will judge fornicators and adulterers” (Heb. 13:04). In the Hebrew Bible (the Old Testament to Christians) there is an entire chapter (eighteen in the book of Leviticus) devoted to improper sexuality. These divine instructions include forebidance of various arrangements of incestuous sex.

What is most interesting is that there is no mention in Leviticus, or any other book in the bible, that specifically addresses premarital sex. Instead, one usually finds broad phrases such as “sexual immorality” or the specific mention of adultery, which Jesus does in chapter five of Matthew. Much of the focus on sexual purity arises from the two birth narratives in Matthew and Luke that write of Jesus’ mother, Mary, being a virgin. The reverence that Mary had among followers—and still does in the Catholic and Orthodox churches—in the early Church articulated an unwritten moral goal for young women. By remaining a virgin, one could ascribe to the notions of purity held by the Virgin Birth narratives. Any disruption of this ideal became antithetical to the desire of God.

In his book Teaching Sex: The Shaping of Adolescence in the 20th Century, Jeffrey P. Morgan writes of the impact that the underlying religious views towards sex affecting sexual education:

…most Americans persisted in viewing adolescent sexuality—when they considered it at all—as an aberration and a moral failure…[sex educator’s] message focused on preventing disease and immorality rather than on preparing for sexual maturity. (99)

If the cultural ideal was for individuals to avoid sex before marriage, it made no sense to approach sexual education in an open, objective format. To the pious Christian, who was also a “sex educator,” why would they encourage immoral behavior? The way sex education was introduced into the country was through the need to alleviate social health concerns.

In the book Sexuality Education Across Cultures: Working with Differences, Janice M. Irvine writes:

Sexuality education has its roots in the social hygiene movements of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. These initiatives were organized around specific problems that included the eradication of what were then called venereal diseases. Early hygiene education was largely didactic, and practitioners focused on giving information about diseases and how to prevent them. (125)

Irvine is correct in her appraisal. The Surgeon General under the Franklin Roosevelt administration, Thomas Parran, had to contend with a syphilis problem in the United States. Through a provision in the Social Security Act and the 1938 National Venereal Disease Control Act, Parran’s Public Health Service funneled millions of dollars to state boards of health to aid in syphilis prevention (Moran 115). Parran was not pleased with governmental timidity and excessive moralism (Moran 115). In fact, Parran was more open to approaching the problem of syphilis through education. Moran continues in Teaching Sex: “Parran…called for medical experts in public health to commence a new crusade against syphilis that would frankly confront the disease as a medical matter and not a moral failure” (115). Such change in policy motivation would still not cause an immediate change.

AVERT, an international AIDS charity, lists that syphilis diagnosis was at its highest point in 1946, a few years after the Federal Government began keeping track of such numbers. In 1946, there was 70.9 cases per 100,000 of the population. It would lower to 2.1 per 100,000 in 2000 (AVERT). Although Parran provided an impetus for medical objectivity at the federal level, it would take years of organization, education, and medical advancements to decrease the number of Americans diagnosed with syphilis. However, the lack of government-sponsored health education programs was perhaps most deadliest in the 1980’s.

The election of Ronald Reagan, a social conservative, in 1980 heralded an opportunity for other conservatives to trump the liberal sexuality that they disagreed with. Jeffrey P. Moran writes of the affect the conservative movement had on the “morality” of the country:

In 1981 Congressed passed the Adolescent Family Life Act (AFLA), which quickly came to be known as the Chastity Act…AFLA denied funds to most programs or projects that provided abortions or abortion counseling, and AFLA mandated abstinence education and units promoting “self-discipline and responsibility in human sexuality” in the sex education programs it did fund. (204)

The social conservative tone during the Reagan years was not responsive to the AIDS epidemic in the United States. This is one of the principle and most vigorous criticisms of Reagan and his social policy. Dan Gilgoff’s article, “Why Critics are Still Mad as Hell,” which appeared in the June 16th issue of U.S. News & World Report, just after President Reagan’s death, writes:

AIDS activists were among Reagan's most outspoken critics, printing posters that featured the president's mug shot and the tag line "AIDSGATE." His detractors say he didn't spend nearly enough on AIDS research; Reagan didn't publicly utter the term "AIDS" until his second term, even as the disease killed thousands of Americans in the early '80s. (“Why Critics are Still Mad as Hell”)

Scathing criticism comes within the article from an AIDS activist: "It's incomprehensible that such hideous inaction hasn't put him in any disrepute," says AIDS activist Larry Kramer. "He's being buried as a saint when in fact he was a gigantic sinner." Hitchens notes that British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher launched a massive AIDS public- education campaign in 1987, "making Reagan's inaction triply disgraceful and obviously deliberate. It wasn't that he wasn't paying attention; it was that he didn't want to go there" (“Why Critics are Still Mad as Hell”)

Kramer seems to have a valid point. President Reagan consistently cut the funds allocated by Congress for the fight against AIDS, and in 1991 the Bush administration [George Bush was Reagan’s Vice President] cancelled the government-sponsored American Teenage Study, which was seeking to gather information about teenage sexual behavior and possible approaches to preventing STD’s (Moran 208).

Social conservatives argue that sex education inspire immoral desires that clash with local community codes of morality. Alexander McKay writes in Sexual Ideology and Schooling: Towards Democratic Sexuality Education, that many conservative notions of democracy “…view that the values and traditions of a particular community can be rightly be promoted to contrast to the values or social traditions of the larger society” (115). A government mandate superceding local norms and mores creates tension among the local communities.

Another issue that conservatives have toward sex education is that it promoted the immoral aspect of sexuality, a belief derived from biblical texts and corresponding religious beliefs. Many of these conservatives saw the liberal sexual behavior that began with the female contraceptive pill in the 1950’s, then the sexual revolution of the 1960’s, and into the Roe v. Wade decision in the 1970’s as evidence that American sexual morals were dramatically off-course. The dominant image remained of a sex education course that encouraged students to engage in sexual behavior (Moran 218).

Liberal sex educators hold the opposite belief. To them, sex education does not go far enough. In Teaching Sex, Moran cites a statistic that iterates the concern that liberal educations had about the education system. From the 1970’s onward, fewer than 10 percent of high school students received comprehensive, value-neutral sexuality education (Moran 218). Liberal thinkers thought that if education could be strengthened and increased, it would have likely minimized the mal-effects of the country’s growing openness to sex. In addition, many modern liberals want the fear from religious-based morality to be removed, enabling a more open and objective discussion of human sexuality. Alan Harris writes in the article “What does ‘Sex Education’ Mean?” that, “…it is high time we adopted a wholly positive approach to sex education, instead of grudgingly throwing a few titbits of information in an atmosphere of moral gloom” (22).

Conservatives and liberals, in a broad generalization of sex education outlooks, could not be further apart. Each side feels that they possess true “common sense” in dictating the sex education policy of the United States. However, it appears that the conservative and liberal camps are neither completely correct.

A 1967 study aimed to address the opinion that sex education increases one’s likelihood to participate in sex. The college-aged participants were asked about any previous sex education. Furthermore, they were questioned about their sexual behavior. The authors of the article “Sex Education and Premarital Petting and Coital Behavior,” Gerald H. Weichman and Altis L. Ellis, summarize the results of the experiment:

Those college students in the sample exposed to “sex education” content prior to college were found no more likely or less likely to have experienced premarital petting or premarital coitus than those without such exposure…Therefore, any promotional or inhibitory effect “sex education” content exposure may have had upon premarital petting or coital experience did not become apparent in the data analyzed. (268)

This study infers that sex education, per se, is not a factor which operates in a significant way to influence premarital sex (Weichman and Ellis 268). These results are not uncommon.
Jeffrey P. Moran writes of the numerous studies done to examine both conservative and liberal claims regarding sex education in Teaching Sex:

Various studies from the 1950’s onward have determined that students who complete a sex education course invariably know more sexual facts than students who have not…But none of the dozens of studies by sociologists, psychologists, and educators has discovered that sex education has a significant effect in either direction on adolescent rates of intercourse, use of contraception, and rates of unwanted pregnancies and births. (219)

Sex education is only a small aspect in determining sexual behavior. The first, and most notable, surveyor of sexuality was Alfred Kinsey.

In the 1950’s, Kinsey both shocked and intrigued the country with his scientific analysis of American sex and sexuality. Kinsey found at mid-century that American sexual patterns differed according to gender, class status, race, educational attainment, religion, decade of birth, age at puberty, and geographical location (Moran 222). Education matters only slightly when compared to the many other determinates of one’s sexuality. How can time spent in limited sexual education curriculum make a “dent,” so to speak, in these numerous determinants of one’s sexual identity?

To penetrate these many social and psychological determinates would require a much more broadened experience in sexual education. The minimal education does not do enough to significantly alter sexual behavior. Janice M. Irvine writes in Sexuality Education Across Cultures, “Comprehensive sexuality education addresses the broadest realm of sexuality, including intimacy, relationships, body image, personal values, and self-esteem” (126). A narrow conception of sexual education does little to impact the many determinates that make up one’s sexuality.

Implementing such change, even if such change was willing to be made at present, would not have immediate affects. Michael Schofield has a diagnosis of what is needed in his article “The Sexual Behavior of Young People.” He states that, “The best hope…is to help the generation now at school to become the kind of parents who can speak simply and sensibly about sex to their children” (170).

Extensive sexual education has been used with success in Sweden. Thomas K. Grose writes of the Swedish sex education system in his article for U.S. News & World Report, “Straight Facts About the Birds and Bees”:

The curriculum starts out clinically at around age 6, when children learn about anatomy, eggs, and sperm. From age 12 on, the topics lean more toward disease and contraception. The classes have a moral dimension, as well: Sex within loving relationships is stressed, as is gender equality (56).

The public education system in Sweden, as in the United States, is one of the best ways to impact the respective culture. Although modern U.S. sex education is deficient in its impacting affects of sexual behavior, a more rigorous, insightful, and objective approach within the sex-related ciruculum will have positive influences for the country, as it has for Sweden. Grose writes that, “The rates of teen pregnancy and sexually transmitted disease in Sweden are among the world’s lowest” (56). In addition, the teenage birthrate is 7 per 1,000 births, compared with 49 in the U.S. (Grose 56). The percentage of teenage girls having sex before 15 is also less in Sweden than it is among the U.S. population (Grose 56). Grose debunks a possible conception that certain conservatives may have that such open sexual discussion may encourage teenagers to engage in sex before their emotional readiness. In fact, Swedish classes urge students to wait until they feel mature (Grose 56).

The enlightened education policy of Sweden is too drastic to be accepted by Americans and their legislators. However, the Sweden-model shows that comprehensive sex education does not have to focus on premarital sex, a largely conservative concern, but can treat human sexuality without the fear and taboo that usually comes with such discussions. If the U.S. were to implement a more enlightened approach to sex, many of the mal-affects of insufficient education would be eliminated. The sexual factors that contributed to such problems in the country’s past, and possible future health issues, would otherwise be already addressed under a comprehensive sex education-model. Yet, the varying cultural norms and mores regarding human sexuality presents conflict to monolithic implementation of sex education. Only by finding common ground among the many participants can the American education system finally move toward an objective, non-religious examination of human sexuality.
















Works Cited

Gilgoff, Dan. “Why Critics are Still Mad as Hell.” U.S. News & World Report 13 June. 2004. 13 Apr. 2007

Grose, Thomas K. “Straight Facts About the Birds and Bees.” U.S. News & World Report Mar 26: 56.

Harris, Alan. “What does ‘Sex Education’ Mean?” Sex Education: Rationale and Reaction. Ed. Rex S. Rogers. New York: Cambridge UP, 1974. 18-23.

Holy Bible: The New American. New York: P.J. Kenedy & Sons, 1970.

Irvine, Janice M. Sexuality Education Across Cultures: Working with Differences. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1995.

McKay, Alexander. Sexual Ideology and Schooling: Towards Democratic Sexuality Education. Albany, NY: New York UP, 1998.

Moran, Jeffrey P. Teaching Sex: The Shaping of Adolescence in the 20th Century. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2000.


Schofield, Michael. “The Sexual Behavior of Young People” Sex Education: Rationale and Reaction. Ed. Rex S. Rogers. New York: Cambridge UP, 1974. 168-80

“United States STD Statistics.” AVERT. 28 Mar. 2007. 13 Apr. 2007

Weichman, Gerald H. and Altis L. Ellis. “A Study of the Effects of ‘Sex Education’ on Premarital Petting and Coital Behavior.” Sex Education: Rationale and Reaction. Ed. Rex S. Rogers. New York: Cambridge UP, 1974. 265-70.

Monday, April 09, 2007

Essay

Separate is Not Equal:
Why the National League Should Adopt the Designated Hitter

Boston Red Sox great Ted Williams said, “Baseball is the only field of endeavor where a man can succeed three times out of ten and be considered a good performer.” Every player dreams of hitting his way to a .300 batting average, a tell of the successful hitter. Yet, a .300 hitter does not get a hit 70% of the time he steps into the batter’s box. Ted Williams is perfectly accurate. Despite the statistical probabilities, every fan and hitter views an at-bat not in terms of what will most likely happen, but with what could happen. This is the mysterious and majestic quality of the baseball hitter. It is this reverence in which the idea of the designated hitter receives such regard by its proponents. By examining the conditions that warranted its implementation, one discovers the beneficial impact that increased offense has on the baseball’s integrity and financial well-being, arguing for its adoption by the National League.

Babe Ruth ruined baseball. The excitement generated from his slugging prowess changed the game forever. If the players before him were mere infantry of the sport, he was the atomic bomb that revolutionized the game. Before him, the game of baseball was boring and uneventful. In his book The Numbers Game: Baseball’s Lifelong Fascination with Statistics, Alan Schwarz describes the bleakness of baseball pre-Ruth. “Baseball in the teens…had basically degenerated into tedious, daily pitcher’s duels. Runs scored one at a time, manufactured piecemeal by the steal-and-sacrifice style…” (44). There was no excitement, no overt drama. Nothing warranted die-hard fascination from the game’s fans. Baseball needed a savior.

George Herman “Babe” Ruth would revive baseball, his bat would be his Lazarus, and he would turn the game into what it currently is—a game of offense. Even those with scarce interest in sports have heard his name uttered among conversations of legendry. The most common association with the mythical hitter is the homerun. By June of 1919, roughly mid-way through the baseball season, Ruth hit his 11th homerun against future hall of fame pitcher Walter Johnson. In fifteen years prior to that hit, no player in the American League had more than 12 home runs in an entire season. Babe Ruth became a star.

Ruth’s power was unprecedented, if not under appreciated. Schwarz writes, “Home runs at that time were like triples today—freak hits that were too rare to be fully appreciated” (45). However, the spectacle of the home run grew with Ruth’s popularity. In 1920, he would hit 54 home runs. He hit 59 one year later. Ruth and his offensive explosion altered the fan base of baseball. Schwarz describes:

The fans Ruth attracted were no the die-hards who put up with the soporific game that baseball had become before and during [World War I]. These new fans who wanted to see runs score, and relished the thrill of watching Ruth swing mightily to make that happen (47).

There was now drama and excitement in baseball. But, perhaps the most ironic aspect to Ruth’s legend comes from knowing his initial role in the sport. The original position of the man that would launch baseball into an era of offensive power, drama, and statistics was that of the archenemy of the baseball hitter—he was a pitcher.

If only every pitcher had the potential for power that Ruth did. General Managers and their team of scouts would purge the U.S. (and every other country, for that matter) of these anomalies for their rosters. However, the game of baseball has evolved over the years since Babe Ruth launched baseballs into mobs of spectators. The offensive efficacy of pitchers has decreased over the years to the near point of embarrassment. Political columnist, and an avid baseball fan, George F. Will goes so far to refer to many of them as “laughable” (not all pitchers are atrocious: Livan Hernandez has a lifetime .234 batting average, Dontrelle Willis, .222). However, most pitchers do not have the talent with the bat that these pitchers do. Despite this, traditionalists remain skeptical of, arguably, the most radical alteration to the game of baseball—the designated hitter.

The reason for the designated hitter is a logical one. The early part of the 1960’s brought the famous home run race involving New York Yankee great Roger Maris, who hit 61 home runs in 1961. This culminated an impressive offensive performance in the preceding decade. G. Richard McKelvey recounts the offensive explosion occurring in baseball in his book All Bat, No Glove: A History of the Designated Hitter. He calculated that during the 1950’s, major league teams had combined for an average of 17.7 hits and 8.8 runs per game (McKelvey 9). As such, the commissioner of baseball after the 1962 season, Ford Frick, persuaded the rules committee of Major League Baseball to enlarge the strike zone, so pitchers would have an advantage against the prevalent offensive potency of their counterparts. This, combined with an increase in the use of relief pitchers by their managers (as batters have a more difficult time adjusting to numerous pitchers in a game as opposed to one, or two), stifled offensive production. In 1968, the combined major league batting average dropped to .237, the second lowest in the century (McKelvey 12). The plan to “equalize” the offense-defense relationship had backfired, and the American League felt the brunt of the force. In 1971, the NL had topped the AL by 129 runs, and they stretched that lead to 824 in 1972 (McKelvey 16). Separate was not equal.

The fans were well aware of the offensive disparity between the two leagues. Without an offensive race that Roger Maris or a Babe Ruth could provide, fans were reluctant to take in a baseball game at American League ballparks. Eight of the twelve AL clubs reported that they had finished in the red in 1972. However, that same season, the NL had nine of its twelve teams attracted over a million fans, compared to three in the AL (McKelvey 19-20). American League owners began to look awfully hard at the different designated hitter appropriations in their minor league affiliates. Finally, by the start of the 1973 season, the American League went ahead with the designated hitter. This change to the rules of baseball was the first in eighty years, when the pitching mound was moved from fifty feet to sixty feet, six inches.

The President of the National League, Charles “Chub” Feeney was opposed to such a dramatic alteration. “Our League doesn’t believe in change for change’s sake. The people know when a tight situation is coming up and it’s fun to sit back and try to figure out who the manager is going to hit for the pitcher. The baseball fan likes to second-guess the manager.” (McKelvey 24). The DH eliminates a piece of strategy whereby the manager must weigh the option of removing a pitcher from the batting lineup for the sake of a pinch-hitter. The pinch-hitter is later replaced by a relief pitcher when the team moves to defense. The “second-guessing” comes into play when one must debate whether a starting pitcher’s performance is more beneficial to a team than their offensive replacement. A close game in late innings makes this an especially intriguing scenario. The opinion of Feeney echoes common, modern objections to the DH. George F. Will summarizes the protests of those opposed to the DH. “The three arguments against the DH are: Tradition opposes it, logic forbids it, and it is anti-intellectual because it diminishes strategy” (58).

Players themselves are split over the decision. In his book Pure Baseball: Pitch by Pitch for the Advanced Fan, former player Keith Hernandez writes:

…if you believe there’s more to baseball than offense, if you believe that a lot of interesting ramifications flow from the fact that your most important player—your pitcher—is, by way of contradiction, probably a weak hitter and that having him bat for himself, or not bat for himself, makes the game more complicated in a dozen ways, then you’re with me (196).

However, the argument against the DH that it minimizes strategy is not universally shared. George F. Will posed this very question to Tony LaRussa, then manager of the Oakland Athletics (LaRussa led the St. Louis Cardinals to a World Series championship in 2006) in his book Men at Work: The Craft of Baseball“: "Warming to his defense of the DH, he says that handling a pitching staff—perhaps a manager’s most important task—is tougher in the American League. ‘Every decision you make in the American League regarding your pitching staff is based solely on who you think should pitch to the next hitter, or in the next inning. In the National League you get certain times when the decision is taken right out of your hands’” (59). The DH doesn’t eliminate strategy—it only alters it. Will grasps this point:

In some ways the DH makes managing more difficult. Again, most pinch-hitting situations are obvious. What often is far from obvious is when to remove pitchers who never need to be removed to increase offense. That is an American League manager’s problem (59).

There is another distinction between AL and NL ball play. When pitchers are in a lineup the offense needs to be more aggressive to compensate for the inadequate hitting pitchers. Because NL lineups have only eight adequate hitters, one less then in AL lineups, offensive risk becomes more acceptable, namely, through the use of stolen bases and sacrifice bunts. This leaves the prototypical American League third base coach with less responsibility. In his book The Hidden Game of Baseball: How Signs and Sign-Stealing Have Influenced the Course of Our National Pastime, Paul Dickson discusses this phenomenon:

The number of offensive signs…in the American League dramatically declined with the advent of the designated hitter in 1973. Baseball historian Andy McCue interviewed several third-base coaches in 1989. He was told by men in both leagues that there were considerably fewer signs given in the early and middle innings of American League games…‘Taking an extra base [via base stealing] is also a one-run strategy, and since an AL third base coach never has to contemplate a pitcher in the on-deck circle as a runner approaches third, he is much freer to put up the stop sign’ (132).

National League lineups require more adverse risk that ultimately diminishes offensive performance. Should the NL adopt the DH, the league would find a minimal need to compensate for inadequate hitting pitchers by sacrificing needed outs through base stealing and sacrifice bunting.

Just as fans flocked to the offensive mammoth that was Babe Ruth, so did they return to the American League ballparks after the implementation of the DH. The American League became the league of power, the home run, the “long ball.” The National League, maintaining the traditional interpretation of the rules and the affirmation of the “intellectual” aspect of the game, was (and still is) known for “small ball,” because of the lack of reliance on pure power in favor of meager strategy. In 1980, well-known Washington Post sports columnist Tom Boswell compared the two leagues eight years after the American League implemented the DH. He wrote that the AL has scored 10.7 percent more runs per team, almost as great as the 12.7 percent that the NL had prior to the DH adoption (McKelvey 65). Accordingly, the AL surpassed the NL in the growth of fan attendance. Between 1973-1982, the regular season attendance increased by 64% in the AL. There was only a 28% increase in the National League (McKelvey 75). The fans liked watching offense, just as they did with Babe Ruth.

The American League is not the sole custodian of the DH. In fact, it seems that most baseball organizations agree with the rule. In the well-regarded Nine Innings: The Anatomy of a Baseball Game, Daniel Okrent describes the prevalence of the DH in baseball. “Still, by 1982, only the National League, and Japan’s Central League, allowed pitchers to hit. In every other baseball league in existence, from Little League and high schools through all of the American minor leagues, the DH rule prevailed” (133, emphases mine). The National League is behind the times.

The original desire for the DH rule was to rectify the dominance of pitchers. Pitching has become a more specialized phenomenon within the sport since the game’s inception. In the early days, it would not be uncommon for a starting pitcher to work into the ninth inning. Their descendents, on the other hand, do not measure up to the mettle of their ancestors. In 1901, 87.3 percent of all games were completed by the starting pitcher. In 1988 only 14.8 were. In 1989 only 11.4 were (Will 135). Why might this happen? George F. Will offers the opinion that the difference the DH makes has attributed the 46% decrease in the number of complete games between the years 1978 through 1987 (Will 135). Will suggest a correlation between the DH rule and the increased usage of relief pitchers. With the addition of more potent hitter replacing a less-adequate one (the pitcher), pitchers would not have the luxury of an “assured” out. However, the addition of one sole hitter can’t solely account for the 46% decline in complete games. If part of the “intellectual” aspect of National League ball is deciding when to replace a starting pitcher with a pinch hitter, then if there was evidence to suggest that pitchers have decreased in hitting competency, one could argue that managers are “forced” to pinch hit more often, requiring more relief pitchers.

Comparing statistics is one of the more difficult undertakings in baseball. How does one compare the offensive performance between two, or more, players? It is not cut and dry as one might think. For instance, managers will often create a lineup where a proficient hitter will bat before a well-known “slugger.” The rationale is that the opposing pitcher would most likely prefer to avoid the slugger. As such, the pitcher will be careful not to walk the batter preceding the slugger, giving him better pitches from which he can hit. However, if the hitter is in, say, the eight spot (usually before the pitcher in the lineup) will most likely not receive hittable pitches—at least ideally—because, even if he should draw a walk, the opposing pitcher will face the opposing pitcher, a far less formidable foe. Comparing a hitter who bats before a “slugger” and one before a pitcher would not yield a truly accurate comparison—the differing variables surrounding their plate appearance are too strong.

Comparing hitters from different generations is even more difficult. How does one account for the different sizes of ballparks, the lack of night games, a shorter season, even a different baseball between decades? There is no scientific way to perfectly “normalize” every variable, and no way to accurately compare different hitters. However, statisticians do try.

One such statistician is David Gassko who, in his February 2007 article “Hitting Pitchers,” which appeared on the online journal The Hardball Times, looked at this very question. He first examined the combined offensive performance of pitchers. He found that pitchers, as a whole, batted .132 in 2006 (the mean of the best and worst MLB team averages was .271). However, Gassko wanted to examine the offensive performance of pitchers in relation to their fielding contemporaries throughout history. Gassko describes his process:

I calculated the [offensive performance] for each player in each season from 1871 to 2005, using whatever statistics were available [this affirms the lack of statistics recorded in the nineteenth century as opposed to the prevalence of modern statistical observation]…I then classified each player in each season as either a pitcher (if he made at least one appearance as a pitcher that year) or a hitter (if he did not), and calculated the league average [offensive performance] BA for both pitchers and hitters…Pitchers were compared to the pitcher average in calculating their runs above average, which were corrected for park factor and then into wins above average to adjust for varying run environments (Hardball Times).

Below is a line graph displaying the results that Gassko found in his research and analysis.

http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/hitting-pitchers/

Although occasional spikes from year to year, there is a clear trend of descending pitcher offensive performance with that of fielding hitters. Pitchers are worse hitters now than they were at the game’s inception.

It appears George F. Will’s description of the hitting abilities of pitchers as “laughable” is not so unwarranted. Although the National League maintains the game’s tradition and intellectual dynamic as an essential rationale for avoiding what the majority of other baseball leagues have adopted, one has evidence that NL teams focus too much on the mere words of baseball’s tradition instead of the game’s current spirit and actuality. Of course the original rules of the game stipulated for pitchers to bat, they were actually competent in that day! They no longer are. Fans respond to offense, offense that the designated hitter can provide. The American League exemplifies this point perfectly. Should the NL adopt the designated hitter, they would see similar results, as their fans would see baseball for what it was intended—with nine adequate hitters; not eight.




Works Cited
Boswell, Thomas. “Time to End 9th-Bat Split.” The Washington Post 31 July 1980, sec. 6.

Dickson, Paul. The Hidden Language of Baseball: How Signs and Sing-Stealing Have Influenced the Course of Our National Pastime. New York: Walker & Co., 2003.

Gassko, David. “Hitting Pitchers.” Chart. The Hardball Times. 25 Feb. 2007 Feb. 2007
<http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/hitting-pitchers>

Hernandez, Keith, and Mike Bryan. Pure Baseball: Pitch by Pitch for the Advanced Fan. New York: HarperPerennial, 1994.

McKelvey, G. Richard. All Bat, No Glove: A History of the Designated Hitter. Jefferson: McFarland & Co, 2004.

Okrent, Daniel. Nine Innings: The Anatomy of a Baseball Game. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1985.

Schwarz, Alan. The Numbers Game: Baseball’s Lifelong Fascination with Statistics. New York: Thomas Dunne, 2004.

Twombly, Wells. “Now the 10th Man.” New York Times Magazine 1 April 1974, 21, 23.

Will, George F. Men at Work: The Craft of Baseball. New York: HarperPerennial, 1990.